Western hegemonic discourse on ‘Pakistan’ and the absence of counter-discourse from Pakistan: An introspective study
Disciplines entail power relations. In the discipline of International Relations, power, which is exercised in the form of ‘epistemic privilege’ by the West, ensures that only the West’s self-centered imaginaries of domination over the ‘rest’ are served.1 The resultant discourse of Western dominance and the entailing power-knowledge nexus means that “IR reinforces analytical categories and research programs that are systematically defined by academic communities within the core, and that determine what can be said, how it can be said, and whether or not what is said constitutes a pertinent or important contribution to knowledge.”2 This way, the authoritative (Western) disciplinary forces grant legitimacy only to that knowledge that conforms to Western standards. As a result, certain narratives and discourses emerge as the dominating knowledge in the field, while others are silenced.
International Relations is a Western-oriented field. For the most part, the Western-centric discourse in International Relations overlooks the non-Western agency in world politics.3 Nonetheless, where the non-European or Third World is brought into the analyses, it is done in a way that either fails to provide authentic representations of the Third World or treats the Third World as an adjunct to the range of ideas generated in connection with the First World. This, consequently, situates the Third World in roles inferior to those assigned to the West. Take, for instance, the discursive creation of the Third World in comparison to the First or Developed World, whose prescriptions (in the form of ‘development’), when followed, promise membership in the latter world sphere4 or the representation of the Third World as ‘underdeveloped’ in the discourse on ‘development,’5 and similarly, the creation of and discourse on the “Orient.”6 This knowledge production implicitly allows the West to exercise its domination over the Third World.7
In the same vein, upon engaging with the literature on ‘Pakistan’ in international scholarship, one observes the advertent reinforcement of the disciplinary status quo. As a product of Western conventional wisdom,8 this version of Pakistan is mainly conceived in a bad light and depicted as a ‘failed state’. So then, Pakistan is, among other things, “an insecure state;”9 a “weak state”; a “garrison state;”10 a “failing state in many ways;”11 “a state sponsor of terrorism”12 as well as “the most dangerous country in the world.”13 This discourse either identifies Pakistan’s so-called state failure with poor governance, points at its possession of nuclear weapons and the presence of committed Muslim fundamentalists in the country, or enlists the possible consequences of Pakistan’s state failure, such as Pakistan succumbing to Islamic extremists.14 If Pakistan is a ‘failed state,’ what then is the opposite of a ‘failed state,’ and more importantly, who determines what a failed state is and on what basis? Answers to these questions reaffirm Western domination in the field of International Relations. My research, from which this essay takes its currency, looks inward as it seeks to interrogate why the Western meanings and labels assigned to Pakistan remain uncontested by the Pakistani academic community. It looks inward to make sense of the outward. The study is based on the primary information obtained through in-depth semi-structured interviews with Pakistani International Relations academics with a doctoral degree. As the higher education structure in Pakistan has tied the promotion of these intellectuals with the number of their research publications, their active involvement in the knowledge production processes makes their views most pertinent for this study.
Undoubtedly, Pakistan has played a critical role in major global geopolitical events, including the Cold War and War on Terror, alongside the West,15 but its contributions have not garnered the recognition it deserves. On the contrary its image is considerably damaged by terming it as a ‘failed state’ in global discourse. As a result of this, ‘Pakistan’ has become the Other of the mainstream academic discourse and has been spoken into the discipline. In explaining why the West thinks of Pakistan as a ‘failed state’, an academic stated that the West staunchly opposes threats against its system, supreme status, and security. Concerning the threat of terrorism, which emerged as a formidable challenge, not only for the West but the entire world, precisely due to Pakistan’s location in the region where the threat surfaced and its close association with Afghanistan, Pakistan became entangled in the unfortunate situation. “We are not a terrorist state… We have ourselves sacrificed so much to terrorism,” contended the academic. She further emphasized that a threat has “a specific cause and you cannot associate a particular act (terrorism) committed by a specific group with the whole of the Muslim world and by that logic, with Pakistan.”16 Hence, Pakistan has been wrongly associated with labels such as an ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’ state by the West.
Almost all academics disagreed with Pakistan’s ‘failed state’ status in the international discourse. For instance, one academic described the Western information regarding Pakistan as “false information” while pointing at the monopoly of Western authors in the field and the skewed knowledge they produce. This academic mentioned that many Western authors have mostly criticized Pakistan under various ‘failed state’ labels leading to the creation of incorrect but shockingly impactful knowledge about Pakistan.17 Further, in explaining why Western authors provide an incorrect portrayal of Pakistan in the international discourse, some academics cited their lack of firsthand information and experience as the main reason.18 For instance, an academic argued that:
International scholars hold opinion, or they construct knowledge…they paint a Pakistani picture, which is not actually valid or correct…I think broadly that is due to a lack of observation and local knowledge. Many of them are not planted in this particular society or in this particular region so they basically capture and build their analyses through the existing body of knowledge, again, the existing verified or globally published body of knowledge is by the Western publishers.19
This signifies that the West’s construction of Pakistan is based on selective information that is infested with subjectivity. Yet, the resultant discourse is deemed ‘legitimate’ and ‘credible’ as it is based on the established (Western) knowledge. During the interviews, an academic offered a correction to this discourse as he described Pakistan as a “struggling state”. According to the academic, Pakistan’s struggles are mostly linked with the external challenges it faces, which have been a consequence of Western involvement in the South Asian region. Pakistan is, however, trying to overcome those (external) challenges, noted the academic.20 This way, Pakistan’s so-called ‘state failure’ can be associated with the Western policies in the region.
With Pakistan suffering pernicious consequences for its involvement in major global wars, one would expect the Pakistani intellectual community to protest and critically refute the ethnocentric categorizations of Pakistan in global International Relations discourse, but that is not the case. There remains an almost non-existent Pakistani voice in global International Relations journals.21 At instances where the marginal presence of Pakistani scholars is felt, it is found that this knowledge is mostly produced by those who are affiliated with the Western knowledge production enterprise,22 leaving only an insignificant percentage of those who write on Pakistan from Pakistan.23 This axiomatically makes these scholars members of the elite Western knowledge hub. Diasporic knowledge cannot be equated with indigenous knowledge. When asked why Pakistani contributions cannot be found in international journals, the academics identified certain intellectual gatekeeping practices maintained by Western publishing enterprises which prevent them from contributing to the discipline’s core. Some of the major impediments for Pakistani academics include the requirements of high-level of English language proficiency,24 methodological rigor,25 and the West’s subjective bias or narrative-based gatekeeping26 in the knowledge production process.
Pakistani academics and scholars mainly turn towards the local publishing enterprise.27 The relatively low intellectual standards maintained by Pakistani journals classify them as “easy journals” compared to Western journals, observed one academic. This explains why the contributions to Pakistani journals are lacking in quality.28 That being said, upon inquiring whether Pakistani academics counter the hegemonic discourse on Pakistan at the local level of knowledge production, it was found that not much is being done in this regard. Almost all academics who were interviewed regretfully informed that they do not see their colleagues in the country generating a significant body of ‘scholarly’ works to counter the Western-dominated discourse on Pakistan. However, when International Relations academics in Pakistan refute Western discourse on Pakistan, they merely provide rhetoric-based and emotion-based responses.29 They become “nationalists” and start offering subjective opinions on the matter,30 or mostly adopt a defensive approach.31 These responses are not objective and academic in nature.32 Hence, the contributions of these academics are mostly confined to local journals and local newspapers, which lack academic rigor. As informed and well-researched perspectives do not go out, it appears that “whatever we (Pakistani academics) publish, we try convincing each other,” an academic remarked.33 While emphasizing the need for generating local (scholarly) knowledge on Pakistan, another academic mentioned that:
“If you generate something locally, one way or the other, it will get outside. And when people come to know of that, they will question it or they might want to even contest it that what you are saying is wrong according to this. This is how these two sets of knowledge meet at a frontier. At that frontier…the argument will now become between the ‘established’ and the ‘alternative’ knowledge. But the first thing is that at the local level you must make an effort to generate that local knowledge.”34
In the absence of any proper academic work even at the local level, Pakistani academics are simply seen “repeating and recycling the existing knowledge” and let us be reminded, the existing knowledge is a Western provision.35 Thus, forming the basis of inquiry for Pakistani academics and reinforcing the disciplinary ethnocentrism. As academics in Pakistan primarily focus on keeping their jobs, seek promotions by getting involved in a number-crunching game in terms of writing and publication, and prefer to fulfill their academic requirements36 by contributing to less demanding local journals, they refrain from critically engaging with the mainstream discourse. As one academic highlighted, what is required is to critically dissect concepts such as ‘failed state’ or a ‘garrison state’ by deconstructing and decontextualizing them. He further added that the thought that “what is the incentive for me in it” has led to a “nonchalant attitude to knowledge (among Pakistani academics) … If you are nonchalant or you have a carefree attitude, you would not care… you would just want to go by the status quo.”37 Other than that, the governmental departments in Pakistan do not share information on critical security matters such as illicit weapons proliferation and counterterrorism efforts, an academic shared while citing her personal experience.38 Therefore, the lack of local incentives and demotivating aspects involved in research and publication in Pakistan further prevent Pakistani academics from challenging the status quo in the field and working towards developing alternative narratives and discourse on Pakistan.
As we examine the global discourse on Pakistan, we note that ‘Pakistan’ is predominantly defined by the West. This version of Pakistan is narrowly conceived and offers an inaccurate representation of Pakistan. However, due to the absence of substantial counter-discourse on ‘Pakistan’ from Pakistan, the meaning of Pakistan is left for the West to determine and stabilize discursively in the field of International Relations. Academics and scholars in Pakistan need to step outside their echo chambers. The Pakistani voice needs to reach outside but in an informed way. The Western hegemonic discourse on Pakistan must be dismantled through critical scholarship. Quality ‘academic’ work must be produced at local and global knowledge production levels. Critical scholarship also needs to be incentivized by the higher education structure in Pakistan so that Pakistani scholarly works contribute meaningfully to Pakistani International Relations academy and the global field of International Relations.
About the Author
Mahnoor Hayat Malik
The author is a Junior Research Fellow at Roads Initiative.
1 M. Fonseca, “Global IR and Western Dominance: Moving Forward or Eurocentric Entrapment?” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 48, no. 1 (2019): 45-59.
2 A. Tickner, “Seeing IR Differently: Notes from the Third World,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 32, no. 2 (2003): 300.
3 A. Alejandro, Western Dominance in International Relations? The Internationalisation of IR in Brazil and India (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019).
4 A. Escobar, “Discourse and Power in Development: Michel Foucault and the Relevance of His Work to the Third World,” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 10, no. 3 (1984): 377-400.
5 A. Escobar, “Reflections on ‘development’: Grassroots approaches and alternative politics in the Third World,” Futures 24, no. 5 (1992): 411-436.
6 Edward Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1978).
7 Escobar, “Discourse and Power in Development,” 1984.
8 A. W. Waheed, Constructing ‘Pakistan’ through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020).
9 Christine Fair et al., “Pakistan: Can the United States Secure an Insecure State?” RAND Corporation, 2010.
10 L. Ziring, “Weak State, Failed State, Garrison State,” in South Asia’s Weak States: Understanding the Regional Insecurity Predicament, ed. T. V. Paul (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2010), 170-194.
11 D. S.Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 10.
12 Ibid., 105.
13 B. Riedel, “Pakistan and Terror: The Eye of the Storm,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618, no. 1 (2008): 31.
14 Waheed, Constructing ‘Pakistan’ through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies, 2020.
15 H. Khan, “Pakistan’s Contribution to Global War on Terror after 9/11,” IPRI Journal 13, no. 1 (2013): 37-56.
16 Dr. Uzma Siraj, assistant professor, interview, June 19, 2021, Islamabad.
17 Dr. Rizwan Naseer, academic, interview, July 1, 2021, Karachi.
18 Interviews with: Dr. Salma Malik, assistant professor, June 28, 2021, Islamabad; Dr. Rizwana Abbasi, head of department, June 21, 2021, Islamabad.
19 Interview with Dr. Rizwana.
20 Interview with Dr. Rizwan.
21 This study focuses on knowledge and discourse circulation through International Relations journals. It considers journals as the lifeline of a discipline in that they offer scholars the most significant platform for debating issues and methodologies, hence, forming the “most direct measure of the discipline itself”; source: O. Waever, “The Sociology of a not so International Discipline: American and European Developments in International Relations,” in Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, ed. P. J. Katzenstein, R. O. Keohane, & S. D. Krasner (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1999), 57.
22 See, for instance, the works by Ayesha Siddiqa on Pakistan. Siddiqa is a Pakistani political scientist who works as a research associate at the SOAS South Asia Institute. She is the first Pakistani scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Her works include: A. Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007); A. Siddiqa, “Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Strategy: Separating Friends from Enemies,” The Washington Quarterly 34, no. 1 (2011): 149-162.
23 Waheed, Constructing ‘Pakistan’ through Knowledge Production in International Relations and Area Studies, 2020.
24 Interviews with: Dr. Mansur Khan, assistant professor, July 2, 2021, Islamabad; Dr. Azhar Ahmad, associate professor, June 30, 2021, Islamabad; Dr. Bakare Najimdeen, head of department, June 8, 2021, Islamabad; Dr. Rizwan; Dr. Salma.
25 Interviews with: Dr. Musarat Amin, associate professor, June 27, 2021, Karachi; Dr. Khurshid Ahmad, senior lecturer, June 29, 2021, Peshawar; assistant professor (Anonymous), June 20, 2021; Dr. Bakare; Dr. Waseem; Dr. Rizwana; Dr. Rizwan.
26 Interviews with: Dr. Waseem Ishaque, assistant professor, June 21, 2021, Islamabad; Dr. Adil Sultan, dean/head of department, June 25, 2021, Islamabad; Dr. Salma; Dr. Azhar.
27 Navnita Chadha Behera, “South Asia: A ‘Realist’ Past and Alternative Futures,” in International Relations Scholarship around the World, ed. Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Wæver (Abingdon: Routledge, 2009), 134-157.
28 Interview with assistant professor (Anonymous), June 20, 2021.
29 Interview with Dr. Adil.
30 Interview with Dr. Rizwana.
31 Interview with Dr. Uzma.
32 Interview with Dr. Adil.
33 Interview with Dr. Rizwana.
34 Interview with Dr. Bakare.
35Ibid.
36 Interviews with: Dr. Rizwana; Dr. Azhar; Dr. Salma.
37 Interview with Dr. Bakare.
38 Interview with Dr. Salma.