The Non-Traditional Security Threat of Climate Change in South Asia

by | Feb 27, 2022 | Essays

The new security agenda that emerged towards the end of the Cold War allowed a reconfiguration of the concept of security. There was a shift from traditional to non-traditional security dimensions. This approach shifts away from the state-level perspective in analyzing security issues and recognizes threats to the economy, polity, environment, and society as crucial threats to the security of the state.1 As part of the shift in the security debate, the issue of climate change secured a notable space in the global discourse. This is reflected through the frequent qualification of climate change as a security agenda in the United Nations Security Council’s 2007, 2009, and 2011 deliberations. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has made efforts to achieve climate stabilization, producing the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Climate Agreement.2 Over the years, the initial discourse on climate change that viewed the problem from a science perspective shifted its focus towards the formulation of mitigation and adaptive strategies3 for efficiently dealing with the climate threat. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)’s report titled Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability highlighted the impacts of climate change across continents and oceans, emphasizing that decisions had to be made on concerning climate-associated risks.4 The consequent impacts would be endured globally, and so, this warranted resilience efforts at all possible levels.

The issue of climate change has exacerbated the environmental threats in the developing parts of the world. Quantifiable risks associated with global climate change are increasingly observed in the developing world. There are prevalent attitudes in the West that climate change is a distant possibility.5 This has led the developing countries to use global platforms to draw the developed world’s attention towards the urgency of the situation and to execute the existing climate-related plans. In the opening address at the Vulnerable Twenty summit hosted by Bangladesh last year, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina called upon the rich countries to lower their carbon emissions and reminded them about the reliance of the developing economies on the delivery of the climate finance of $100 billion per annum as promised over a decade ago.6 Last year, during a United Nations-sponsored meeting, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan stated that the “commitments made under the Paris Agreement must be fully implemented” and highlighted the unrealized climate finance pledges made by the developed countries.7 The developing countries blame the rich countries for causing most of the climate change effects that the world is facing today. This is because initially, these countries were engaged in the production of carbon emissions.8 Pakistan has accused wealthy countries of not realizing the threat of climate change and taking late measures in addressing the issue.9 Despite forming a global issue, climate change entails unevenly distributed risks across the globe. The South Asian region has increasingly gained attention as one of the hotspots of the world’s most disaster-prone areas. Some geological factors that scholars have identified to understand South Asia’s susceptibility to climate change include the region’s geographical setting, low altitude, deltaic topography, and irregular climatic patterns regulated by monsoon.10The region is home to approximately a quarter of the world’s total population.11 The climate change issue can expose states’ vulnerabilities in political, economic, and social contexts. With this being so, climate change has put the survival of the states at significant risk.12 The population-dense region necessitates an understanding of how ‘climate change’ is framed as a security issue in South Asia, an examination of the climate-related challenges the region is experiencing/ is exposed to, and an assessment of the efficacy of climate-related regional response mechanisms. Overall, this essay offers an evaluation of the climate change threat and the linked South Asian security concerns while remaining within the purview of the broader understanding of ‘security.’

Barry Buzan and colleagues affiliated with the Copenhagen School have espoused a new promising approach to study the idea of security.13 The traditional approach to security that held the state as the referent object and viewed security as being synonymous with power had to be expanded in the post-Cold War era, where dimensions attached to the concept of security were manifold. Therefore, incorporating concepts such as regional security, societal, and environmental security into the security framework was necessary in providing a comprehensive understanding of the notion.14 Buzan has attempted to understand how threats are constructed or ‘securitized’ by actors majorly in five sectors: political, military, economic, societal, and environmental. These sectors are interlinked in offering explanations linked to the concept of security. Environmental security is most controversial of all five sectors of security. It deals with events beyond human control, and their impacts may broadly be felt across the globe.15 To preserve the environment, the environment had to be securitized.

South Asian leaders have underscored how climate change forms a crucial threat to their countries. While speaking about the impacts of climate change, Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina has drawn attention to her country as being among the worst-impacted countries despite the country’s insignificant contribution to carbon emission.16 At the COP26 climate summit in Glasgow last year, Modi remarked that “the last few decades have proved that no one is untouched by the wrath of climate change. Whether they are developed countries or countries rich in natural resources, this is a big threat to everyone.”17 At the Middle East Green Initiative Summit, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan emphasized that”…unfortunately, we (Pakistan) are among the 10 countries most vulnerable to climate change.” He further pointed out that in the last decade, Pakistan experienced “152 extreme weather events…which had triggered an economic loss of over $3.8 billion.”18 The recent release of Pakistan’s National Security Policy 2022-2026 clearly manifests Pakistan’s climate-related security concerns. The Policy adopts a citizen-centric ‘Comprehensive National Security’ framework for the country while addressing traditional and non-traditional security themes critical for Pakistan’s national security.19 Separately, with the CO2 percentage in the atmosphere being 392 parts per million (ppm), linked to which is a severe risk of further rise in the sea level in the Maldives, Maldives is fearful that the state might submerge in water. Former Maldives President Nasheed, while highlighting the seriousness of the issue stated that “it won’t be any good to have a democracy if we don’t have a country.”20 If not addressed now, climate change will unleash much worse effects on the region in the near future.

According to the United Nations estimates, the region’s current population is likely to increase by 40 percent by 2050. The climate change threat intensifies the food insecurity threat for South Asia’s growing population. About 70 percent of the regional population is employed in agriculture, and this percentage of the population is most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.21 Due to greater reliance on agriculture for livelihood, physical isolation, low access to global markets, and underdeveloped infrastructure, the people in the Hindu Kush Himalayan region, constituting parts of Pakistan, India, and Nepal, are most vulnerable to climate change.22 Food security is already fragile for the population in South Asia, and climate change will exacerbate the regional food security situation.23 The Himalayan glaciers, which fill up rivers in the Indo-Gangetic plains of Pakistan, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh as their primary water source, are likely to shrink in the coming years. Resultantly, the food and livelihood security of millions in Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, India, and Bangladesh will be undermined. In the region, a substantial loss of 10-40 percent in crop production can possibly be witnessed by the end of the century.24 In addition to that, rising temperatures, river floods, receding glaciers, extreme weather conditions will be a pressing challenge for the long-term food security of the region.25 The climate change issue is deteriorating the quality of life of the South Asian people and wellbeing of regional societies.

Climate-related impacts are observed across all segments of society. According to the report developed by the University of Sussex and ActionAid UK in 2007, poor women in Bangladesh, India, and Nepal are struggling to take care of their homes and livelihoods in the face of climate-related effects. Women are more prone to climate-related impacts because they are heavily dependent on the threatened natural resources for their role as food producers and providers. This way, women play an essential role in their household’s economy. Households led by women form a significant part of South Asia’s rural economy. These constitute 15 percent of households in Bangladesh, 10 percent in Nepal, and 35 percent in rural parts of India. Upon losing their livelihoods, these women can be pushed into poverty and further become a victim of increased gender discrimination.26 Women also face increased violence during disasters. According to a study, in the wake of the 2004 tsunami that affected various South Asian countries, particularly in Sri Lanka, there was increased sexual and domestic violence against women. Among other reasons, this was due to the economic marginalization and lack of access to resources that had increased women’s dependence on men and their vulnerability. Similar cases were also reported in India, which was also affected by the tsunami.27 In addition to women, children are also among the most vulnerable to climate-related effects.28 A UNICEF report from 2021 reveals that children in Afghanistan, India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan are at “extremely high-risk” of climate impacts in South Asia. George Laryea-Adjei, UNICEF Regional Director for South Asia has stated, “droughts, floods, air pollution and river erosion across the region have left millions of children homeless and hungry, and without any healthcare and water.”29 Moreover, climate change has severely affected the economic well-being of the farming community in South Asia. The decreasing crop yield or unsuccessful agricultural production might even lead to farmers committing suicide.30 Climate change has resulted in over 59,000 such suicides in India in the past three decades. A major contributing factor is failing harvest leading to poverty.31 A new emerging dimension of climate change is linked to human displacement, creating a community of climate-induced migrants in the region.

There is an emerging body of discourse on the issue of climate change-induced human displacement in regions, particularly the SAARC region. A new category of people known as ‘climate refugees’ has come to the fore.32 According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre’s (IDMC) latest Global Report on Internal Displacement 2020, 9.5 million disaster displacements were recorded in South Asia in 2019. This marked the highest number of displacements that took place in the region since 2012. In 2019, the highest number of displacements due to disasters occurred in India. Among other climatic events, monsoon in India and Bangladesh and cyclones Fani and Bulbul forced people to flee their homes.33 Every year, seasonal floods in Bangladesh result in the displacement of 500,000–1 million people.34 The situation in the region has worsened as from Afghanistan to Bangladesh, and from Sri Lanka to India, mass displacements that took place because of conflict and violence have significantly increased due to disasters and their harmful effects.35 Furthermore, heatwaves are severely affecting countries like Pakistan and India. Temperatures are likely to rise above habitable thresholds in the densely populated region. Studies have further revealed that migrations would accelerate due to the heat stress, surpassing flood-based numbers of displacement.36

Climate change-induced cross-border migrations form an even more pressing concern for the region. Cross-border migrations are convenient due to the regional countries’ porous borders and cultural and historical ties.37 In 2015, more than 85 percent of the migrants in South Asia belonged to other countries in the region. Nepali migrants in Bhutan and India, Sri Lankan Tamils in India, and Chakmas in Bangladesh have heightened security issues for the host countries.38 There are growing numbers of Bangladeshi and Nepali migrants in India, notably in West Bengal and Assam, who have fled their homes primarily because of natural disasters.39 The intolerance that Bangladeshi migrants face in these areas has further heightened regional tensions.40 During the past elections in the state of Assam, the issue of Bangladeshi migration has been securitized, and Bangladeshi deportation has gained a central position in the political debates in India. In addition to land and resources, Bangladeshi migrations threaten the identity of the state (of Assam), especially the ethnic Bodo group. Tensions are heightening between the two groups, giving rise to violence against Bengali-speaking Muslim villages.41 Fears of being outnumbered within their state are growing among the Assamese-speaking population.42 Consequently, the National Registry of Citizens implemented in Assam since 2015 recently turned into an anti-Muslim exercise with the passing of the Citizenship Amendment Bill by the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party in India. Two million Muslim residents in Assam were removed from the list43 and made stateless persons.44 This denotes how migration – a consequence of climate change – has been securitized and treated as a threat to not only the state’s security but also the security of society.

Since the establishment of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), there has been cooperation among the regional countries to address the issue of climate change. Regional concerns regarding environmental degradation and climate-associated risks were highlighted in the Third SAARC Summit convened in 1987. A regional study on the Protection and Preservation of the Environment and the Causes and Consequences of Natural Disasters was finalized by SAARC in 1991. In the SAARC Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change in 2008, an unprecedented step was taken as member countries adopted the SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change.45 More importantly, an expert group on climate change was created in 2010 for guidance on regional cooperation.46 Despite the existence of regional climate change frameworks, the execution of agreed plans is still far from being achieved.

The SAARC member countries are dedicated to and aware of the climate change risks for the regional countries, but political commitment for the effective implementation of climate plans remains absent.47 Although a few governments have designed their National Action Plans on Climate Change that offer adaptive and mitigation strategies for climate change, what is crucially required is a Regional Adaptation and Mitigation Framework for South Asia that boosts the region’s adaptive capacities and other counter-response mechanisms in tackling climate change.48 The rift between SAARC members, especially Indian attempts at isolating Pakistan within the regional forum, has caused severe impediments in achieving any of the objectives of the organization, particularly those addressing the issue of climate change. To achieve cooperation, India and Pakistan should keep their mistrusting attitudes aside. Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan has highlighted the threat of climate change quite frequently, and India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi is determined to make efforts beyond the 2015 Paris Accord to fight climate change. This is where the interests of the two countries converge.49 India and Pakistan can join hands, utilize the SAARC platform, and hold the region together in dealing with the threat of climate change.

It is perhaps the need of the hour to establish a SAARC fund that is essentially devoted to climate change problems. The Regional Food Bank, which was formed in 2007, has insufficient reserves, and this was exposed in the face of Bangladesh floods in 2017 and the resultant food insecurity. Hence, the funding sources need to be identified to implement regional action plans on climate change. Most of the projects are implemented by the national governments through funds obtained within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).50 What can be considered a promising option can be something similar to what was achieved by SAARC members in the wake of the Covid-19 global health crisis; SAARC’S Covid-19 Emergency Fund. Over a video conference of SAARC leaders, India proposed a Covid-19 emergency fund and pledged to contribute $10 million to the fund. This was a timely response to the Covid-19 threat looming over the South Asian countries and threatening their economies.51 Following that, Bangladesh announced $1.5 million, Afghanistan and Nepal $1 million each, the Maldives $0.2 million, Bhutan $0.1 million, and Sri Lanka $5 million funds. Later, Pakistan also pledged $3 million in support of regional efforts against the Covid-19 crisis.52 This indicates how the regional countries came together to support members who suffered from a global (non-traditional security) crisis. Climate change being a global and non-traditional security issue can also engender similar or even greater regional cooperation through SAARC.

Climate change is a global threat but the uneven distribution of its effects calls for coordinated regional responses. South Asian countries are highly vulnerable to climate change. The adverse effects of climate change have eroded the region’s social, economic, political, and environmental landscapes. These effects have also intertwined the security concerns of the regional countries to a reasonable extent. Where climate change appears as an existential security threat to South Asian countries (as identified mainly at the national level), concrete regional actions remain absent. Climate change – a non-traditional security threat is a unique opportunity and occasion for the countries in South Asia to forge and adopt regional mechanisms for cooperation. This can be achieved by utilizing the SAARC platform and launching a consolidated regional response. The time for action is now.

About the Author

Mahnoor Malik

Mahnoor Malik is a Junior Research Fellow at Roads Initiative.

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50 Krampe and Swain, “Is SAARC Prepared to Combat Climate Change and its Security Risks?” 2018.

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