Pulwama/ Balakot Strikes and Deterrence Instability in South Asia

The eruption of Pulwama/Balakot crisis2 has set new patterns of engagement between India and Pakistan thus creating high probability of sub-conventional assault under the nuclear overhang. The Balakot misadventure was indeed laced with dangerous escalatory risks that carried the potential to have swiftly breached the nuclear thresholds. This event has posed renewed dent to regional deterrence stability. If not managed bilaterally, the next similar crisis may promptly motivate the two sides into mischaracterization, misperception and accidents and might possibly lead to a nuclear exchange given the two states’ geographical proximity and time-factor involved.

The Balakot Strikes was a classical example of strategic stability-instability paradox3 – the notion that two countries with nuclear weapons can be more likely to engage in small-scale conflict. Because each side knows that the other doesn’t want to risk a wider war given nuclear risks, they can feel more confident engaging in smaller provocations, aggression and assaults.

In case of Balakot, India misleadingly assumed that it can defy credibility of Pakistan’s deterrent force thus questioning the latter’s national resolve. Yet credible minimum deterrence4 was maintained at the strategic level; it was not a failure of deterrence as none of Pakistan’s redlines, as generally understood, were crossed. Subsequently, de-escalation happened and both states somewhat behaved rationally while exhibiting restraint. The dogfight was played out in a measured and controlled manner, hence keeping the scale of violence limited leading to de-escalation due to the fear of use of nuclear weapons. However, in the backdrop of full-spectrum deterrence claims, confusion in some quarters persist on the failure of nuclear deterrence. Arguably, there is a need to avoid raising public expectations of total immunity to even any small breach. Breaches, are bound to occur but deterrence holds. Yet claims of total invincibility might lead to lowering of morale when such breaches occur.

The Indian brinkmanship during the Balakot crisis is suggestive of the Cold war model. The U.S. and the Soviet Union, underwent similar sort of crises during the Cold War but always managed to step back from the brink. For instance, similar events such as the invasion of Hungary did occur during the Cold War.5 Even today, Russia can be relatively confident that the U.S. and its allies won’t come to Ukraine’s defense directly,6 because such a clash carries the threat of nuclear war. It was this rationale which made Russian President, Vladimir Putin more confident that his invasion could succeed. It is worth noting that the two states’ direct territories are not involved in these instances whereas in case of India and Pakistan geographical contiguity is a serious escalatory factor.

During Balakot crisis, Indian threat of launching Brahmos missiles7 to engage targets in Pakistani territory was highly escalatory thus leading to the creation of false positive or false negative escalation risks.8 Pre-and post-launch ambiguity persists between India and Pakistan. Further, there is no distinction between nuclear and conventional delivery systems. Mischaracterization, ambiguity and uncertainty prior to launch did persist throughout the Cold War period. This risk is present in South Asia too.

Moreover, the Balakot event highlighted the evolving leadership crisis in India. Without realizing that the strike could push both states to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe and without a plan pull back in time in case the crisis escalated, Prime Minister Modi ordered the launch of surgical strikes, thus compelling Pakistan for a bigger conventional response. India indulged in nuclear Saber-rattling since Premier Modi’s threat of ‘the night of murder’ was not only just a highly emotional and irrational political move, but it also generated serious doubts regrading validity of Indian no-first-use doctrinal commitment – a concern which Pakistan has always underscored. More so, mobilization of Indian nuclear submarine during the Balakot crisis also directs questions to the Indian NFU policy.9

U.S. tacit support for India to launch surgical strikes has generated new risks between the two nuclear rivals.10 This event clearly signaled a diminished direct role of the U.S., as a crises manager in South Asia. This in turn may create space for Russia / China to play key role as mediators. This episode also called into question the utility of bilateral crises management channels such as military to military, political to political, director-general military operations (DGMOs) or foreign secretary level hotlines. Strategic communication should be done through formal communication channels which were not operational during Balakot crisis.

The Indian media played a sensational role in the whole fiasco thus generating war frenzy11 and pushing the BJP government towards risky surgical strikes. Unlike Pakistan, domestic politics has always been a significant factor in Indian nuclear policy. More so, not only did Modi campaign on his handling of the crisis and his willingness to commit a ‘night of murder,’ he also promised to strip Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status. He has now taken that step,12 prompting what may begin yet another cycle of violence in South Asia thus creating more space for false-flag operations.

To sum up, it goes without saying that any Indian misadventure in the future cannot be ruled out – especially after Indian acquisition of French Rafaela jets13 and Russian S-400 missiles.14 The new patterns of engagement have compelled Pakistan to strengthen its conventional deterrent capability to prevent the lowering of its nuclear threshold. The recent Russian invasion of Ukraine15 is also suggestive of the continued relevance of nuclear deterrence, but in parallel, conventional deterrence has become pertinent if states want to fight in order to achieve their demands without escalating the crisis to a bigger level.

In that backdrop, both the states should place serious focus on risks reduction measures. Some risk reduction measures can include reactivating dialogue; rehabilitating strategic communications channels; introducing code of conduct on use of media during crises. Other strategies can include restraint measures against the deployment of de-stabilizing systems which could seriously impact crises and arms control stability and initiation of talks between both sides to clarify the nature of different missiles specifying which ones are conventional and which ones are assigned with strategic role.

Both sides should learn lessons from Balakot: firstly, there is no victory for both the states under the nuclear overhang even if they get involved in similar kind of dogfights again; secondly, the uncontrollable escalation risks are associated with a conflict between the two states, given the geographical proximity and time factor involved on nuclear use decision; thirdly, U.S. has now a diminished role in managing crisis amid crisis situations in South Asia; fourthly, both states should act rationally as emotional and intolerant behavior is not a legacy that nuclear weapons states endure; finally, both should make certain compromises in order to implement risk reduction measures to avoid such misadventures thus avoiding misperceptions, accidents and inadvertent escalation.

About the Author

Dr. Rizwana Abbasi

The author is an Associate Professor at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan.

12 Hannah Ellis, India strips Kashmir of special status and divides it in two, The Guardian (31 October 2019).