Power and Consent: Interpreting Gramsci’s Multidimensional Nature of Hegemony

Apr 16, 2023 | Blogs

Just as a captain cannot steer a ship without the crew’s cooperation, rulers cannot exercise power without the consent of the governed or as Parker contends:

Dominant groups in society, including fundamentally but not exclusively the ruling class, maintain their dominance by securing the “spontaneous consent” of subordinate groups, including the working class, through the negotiated construction of a political and ideological consensus that incorporates both dominant and dominated groups.1

Hegemony as a Complex and Multidimensional Concept

The notion of hegemony as an independent and self-contained concept is illusory.2 Within the field of International Relations, there has been a longstanding interest in the concept of hegemony, which has been traditionally understood to imply the dominance or leadership of a single state over others.3 While mainstream accounts of IR have emphasized the strength of such leadership through the study of specific historical epochs, Gramscian scholars have provided alternative accounts that underscore the role of class alliances, power and consent, and elite-driven ideologies in the forging of hegemonic relationships.4 This has yielded a nuanced understanding of the ways in which hegemony operates at the international level, but this approach risks oversimplification and neglect of the rich complexity of Gramsci’s own theoretical elaboration of the term.5 Gramsci’s work offers no definitive propositions with regards to hegemony. However, his broad conception of hegemony involves the synthesis of class relations around a particular mode of production, whereby the ruling class secures the consent of the subordinate classes through the dissemination of its own ideology and values, leading to the establishment of a dominant hegemonic discourse.6

Hegemony has been the subject of temporal multi-layered analyses and interpretations. As Buci-Glucksmann posits that hegemony’s signification has undergone a striking metamorphosis compared to its earlier application.7 Gramsci’s initial usage of the term “hegemony” in his earlier writings alluded to a different approach for the proletariat. But, his later works redefine the term as referring to the hegemonic apparatuses and methodologies of the ruling class.8 In his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci went further to extend the purview of hegemony to cover the structure of the state as well as the ascendance of a particular social class during the revolutionary process of transformation.9 The notion of hegemony is thus a multidimensional and intricate concept that requires meticulous investigation of Gramsci’s multifaceted writings and the historical evolution of hegemony’s meaning.

The historical development of hegemony is far-reaching. Peter Ives postulates that the concept of hegemony has an extensive antecedent history, tracing its roots back to Ancient Greece.10 However, other scholars, influenced by Gramsci’s work, explore the genesis of hegemony in Marxist and Leninist ideologies of economic conflict.11 As discussed earlier in this essay, Gramsci’s discourse on hegemony goes beyond the mere assertion of the leadership and domination of the ruling class.12 He advances the notion that hegemony is established through the tacit consent, intellectual authority, and dominance of the ruling class.13 However, Gramsci places a significant emphasis on the role of hegemonic apparatuses. These apparatuses provide a means for the dominant class to maintain their hegemonic control over the populace and add a cultural dimension to the understanding of hegemony.14 For instance, within media discourses, the notion of “the Other” is a significant factor that affects both the immediate and long-term aspects of national unification. Specifically, the dominant media outlets foster a shared sense of national identity and cultural legacy by providing representations for various cultures and nations.15 Mainstream media has the power to convert the institutional concept of a nation into an ordinary experience of cultural distinctions and commonalities.16 Consequently, the mass media offer their viewers a sense of national coherence while simultaneously establishing a dichotomy between the cultural “Other,” who is frequently depicted as a foe or a menace. Ultimately, Gramsci’s investigation is grounded in the dialectic of consent and coercion, as well as the function of the contemporary state.

Hegemonic rule is essentially rule by consent.17 Within the framework of the idea of hegemony, Femia places a great deal of focus on the significance of consent. In order to understand the ambiguity and variety of interpretations that are associated with permission, his analysis begins by offering some historical backdrop.18 In current political thought, the authority of governments to exert power is not related with consent in the same way that it once was. Femia argues that “consent has evolved to denote the manner in which individuals should participate directly or indirectly in the action of governing, as well as the manner in which the government should be organised and formed.”19 Femia demonstrates that when Gramsci talks about consent, he is in fact referring to a psychological condition that involves some kind of acceptance of the sociopolitical order.20

In order to shed light on what Gramsci meant by “consent,” Femia proceeds to examine a variety of behaviours that include complying to various political and social norms.21 Conforming behaviour is distinguished by three distinct types of attitudes, which are as follows: To begin, an individual may feel pressured to conform out of dread of the consequences of nonconformity. This is compliance through the use of force. Second, the notion of conformity may be perceived as a patterned behavior that strives to achieve specific objectives through specific methods. A third type of conformity relates to the notion of legitimacy, which involves the belief that requests for conformity are appropriate and justified within a given context.22 This type of conformity is grounded in a conscious commitment or agreement with specific societal foundations. Gramsci’s theory posits that the link between consent and hegemony can be observed through these three distinct types of conformist behaviors.23 Thus, it can be inferred that the interplay between legitimacy, conformity, and hegemony constitutes a complex web of relationships that are not easily unraveled.

The Three Levels of Hegemony, and the Intersection of Gramsci and Arendt

The theory of hegemony regards consent as the fundamental concept, with Gramsci alluding in his writings to three distinct levels of hegemony that stem from the concept of consent.24 The first level or type of hegemony, integral hegemony, is characterised by an organic link between the ruling and ruled groups, with no disagreements or hostilities between them in a stable environment. The second level of hegemony, degenerate hegemony, is characterised by discord and strife between the populace and their leaders. The third level, minimum hegemony, is characterised by the ideological unification of economic, political, and intellectual elites with the general populace, leading to the expansion of the ruling class.25 These levels of hegemony suggest that governments and ruling elites are not capable of guaranteeing the general populace’s acceptance without difficulty, and as a result, hegemony and consent are dependent on elements of power and authority. The link between power and consent is the common denominator across all levels of hegemony.

Furthermore, it is imperative to expound on the notion of force or power in order to comprehend Gramsci’s theory of hegemony. The relationship between power and consent is at the crux of Hannah Arendt’s body of work as well. Arendt posits that the desire for power and submission are intertwined, and that the support of the people lends authority to state institutions, which is an extension of the consent that led to the formation of norms.26 The urge for power is linked to the desire for submissiveness.27 Arendt presents definitions for force, power, and violence, which many scholars continue to use interchangeably with the term “coercion.”28 This interpretation of power and consent is germane to Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, which highlights the relationship between power and consent at various levels of societal organization.

Interrelationship Between Force, Power, and Consent

To grasp the essence of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, one must first have a clear understanding of the interrelationship between force and power. Arendt argues that ‘power’ is the ability of individuals to act together as a group, which can only exist when the group is cohesive.29 When we speak of someone as powerful, we imply that he has been granted the authority to make decisions and take action on behalf of a large number of people. Conversely, ‘force’ is often equated with ‘violence’ in everyday discourse, particularly when it is utilised as a means of coercion.30 Nevertheless, force can also refer to the energy derived from physical or social processes. The distinctive feature of violence, which is closely connected to the concept of power, is its pragmatic nature. By drawing distinctions between these categories, Arendt underlines her position that power is a fundamental component of all dominant groups and governments, but it is not synonymous with violence.31 Moreover, Arendt defines power in terms of consent, which is one of the two foundational pillars of hegemony, the other being coercion.32

The linkage between force and consent through the notion of hegemony is one of Gramsci’s most sophisticated contributions to the study of state function and social transformation. Gramsci is particularly concerned with the balance between civil and political society and the relationship between force and consent.33 Therefore, hegemony is an intricate political and intellectual concept that refers to the dominant class’s political, moral, and cultural power over subordinate groups.34 The hegemonic authority does not rely on overt propaganda to create a certain reality but instead relies on a range of civil society institutions, such as education, religion, mass media, and popular culture, to disseminate dominant values.35 Gramsci contends in his Prison Notebooks that hegemony operates through the creation of a “false consciousness” that the subordinate class accepts as its own, believing the ideology and interests of the ruling class.36 The crux of the matter is that hegemony is perpetuated by middle-class intellectuals, who unconsciously act as the agents of the dominant class, organizing and disseminating dominant values.

Conclusion

Hegemony is a complex and multidimensional term, which is not solely defined by the dominance or leadership of one state over others. Gramscian alternative accounts argue that hegemony can be understood as a synthesis of class relations around a particular mode of production, whereby the ruling class secures the consent of the subordinate classes through the dissemination of its own ideology and values. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony goes beyond the mere assertion of the leadership and domination of the ruling class. He advances the notion that hegemony is established through the tacit consent, intellectual authority, and dominance of the ruling class, with a focus on the role of hegemonic apparatuses, such as the media. The meaning of hegemony has undergone significant changes over time, and it is an intricate concept that requires a meticulous investigation of Gramsci’s multifaceted writings and the historical evolution of its meaning. Lastly, as discussed in this essay, Arendt’s idea of power and consent is germane to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, and their interrelationship provides a nuanced understanding of the complex concept.

About the Author

Arsim Tariq

Arsim Tariq is Editor and Research Associate at The Truth International, Islamabad, Pakistan. He is a graduate of National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan with a master’s degree in Peace and Conflict Studies.

1 Parker, H. N. (2011). Toward a definition of popular culture. History and Theory, 50(2), 147-170.

2  Stoddart, M. C. (2007). Ideology, hegemony, discourse: A critical review of theories of knowledge and power. Social Thought & Research, 191-225.

3  Murray, K., & Worth, O. (2013). Building consent: Hegemony,‘conceptions of the world’and the role of evangelicals in global politics. Political Studies, 61(4), 731-747.

4  Stoddart, M. C. (2007). Ideology, hegemony, discourse: A critical review of theories of knowledge and power. Social Thought & Research, 191-225.; Fontana, B. (2008). Hegemony and power in Gramsci. In Hegemony (pp. 80-106). Routledge.

5  Murray, K., & Worth, O. (2013). Building consent: Hegemony,‘conceptions of the world’and the role of evangelicals in global politics. Political Studies, 61(4), 731-747.

6  Gramsci, A. (2009). Hegemony, intellectuals and the state. Cultural theory and popular culture: A reader, 2, 210-216.

7  Buci-Glucksmann, C. (1980). Gramsci and the State.

8  Mouffe, C. (2014). Hegemony and ideology in Gramsci. In Gramsci and Marxist theory (pp. 168-204). Routledge.

9  Harman, C. (2007). Gramsci, the Prison Notebooks and philosophy. International Socialism, 114, 105-23.

10  Ives, P. (2004). Language and hegemony in Gramsci (pp. 144-160). London: Pluto Press.

11  Mouffe, C. (Ed.). (2014). Gramsci and Marxist Theory (RLE: Gramsci). Routledge.

12  Ives, P. (2004). Language and hegemony in Gramsci (pp. 144-160). London: Pluto Press.

13  Ibid.

14  Lears, T. J. (1985). The concept of cultural hegemony: Problems and possibilities. The American historical review, 567-593.

15  Barker, C. (1999). Television, globalization and cultural identities (pp. 84-93). Buckingham: Open University Press.

16  Ibid.

17  Femia, J. (1975). Hegemony and consciousness in the thought of Antonio Gramsci. Political studies, 23(1), 29-48.

18  Femia, J. V. (1987). Gramsci’s political thought: Hegemony, consciousness, and the revolutionary process.

19  Ibid.

20  Femia, J. (1975). Hegemony and consciousness in the thought of Antonio Gramsci. Political studies, 23(1), 29-48.

21  Femia, J. V. (1987). Gramsci’s political thought: Hegemony, consciousness, and the revolutionary process.

22  Ibid.

23  Jain, R. K. (1996). Hierarchy, hegemony and dominance: Politics of ethnicity in Uttar Pradesh, 1995. Economic and political weekly, 215-223.

24  Femia, J. V. (1987). Gramsci’s political thought: Hegemony, consciousness, and the revolutionary process.

25  Ibid., 23-60.

26  Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

27  Ibid.

28  Presbey, G. M. (1992). Hannah Arendt on Power, Consent, and Coercion.; Presbey, G. M. (1992). Hannah Arendt on Power, Consent, and Coercion: Some Parallels with Gandhi. The Acorn, 7(2), 24-32.; Presbey, G. M. (1997). Hannah Arendt on power. In Philosophical perspectives on power and domination (pp. 29-40). Brill.; Haugaard, M. (2009). Power and hegemony. The sage handbook of power, 239-256.

29  Presbey, G. M. (1997). Hannah Arendt on power. In Philosophical perspectives on power and domination (pp. 29-40). Brill.

30  Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

31  Desmoulins, C. Hannah Arendt’s Theory of Nonviolence.

32  Arendt, H. (1970). On violence. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

33  Buci-Glucksmann, C. (1980). Gramsci and the State.

34  Chandler, D. (2000). Marxist media theory. Daniel Chandler.

35  Gramsci, A. (2005). The intellectuals. Contemporary sociological thought–Themes and theories, 49-58.

36  Golding, P., & Murdock, G. (2018). Ideology and the mass media: the question of determination. In Ideology and cultural production (pp. 198-224). Routledge.; Gramsci, A. (2005). The intellectuals. Contemporary sociological thought–Themes and theories, 49-58.