Indian Cruise Missile Misadventure: Malfunction or Malafide Intentions?

Introduction

The launching of the Brahmos cruise missile into Pakistan’s territory from India serves as a reminder for renewed threats to strategic stability in South Asia and points towards nuclear risks associated with Indian nuclear program.

On March 9, an Indian Brahmos class, nuclear capable, supersonic cruise missile with no warheads attached, landed in Mian Channu, around 80 miles inside Pakistan’s territory. The Indian accidental or advertent firing of Brahmos missile received restrained response from Pakistan in order to prevent eventuality of any sort of escalation between the two nuclear weapon states. India failed to notify Pakistan after the launch of this projectile. The Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) hotlines of the two countries were not used. There was no other military, diplomatic or political channel used by India to notify Pakistan of this fire till the time Pakistani’s Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) held a public press conference asking India for explanation on the incident.1 Regardless of whether it was a malfunction or guided by malafide intentions to test Pakistan’s readiness, the Indian missile landing in Pakistan’s territory has led to a flagrant violation of latter’s air space, United Nations Charter, international aviation rules and safety protocols.2 In addition, the missile launch carried a huge escalation potential between two nuclear weapon states, endangered human life and property beside risking the broader regional peace and stability. The Indian missile launch in Pakistan’s territory has brought to spotlight a set of puzzling questions: Was it an accidental launch or intentional act to test readiness of Pakistan’s missile defense systems? Why did India fail to notify Pakistan of this missile launch immediately? If it was an accidental launch then does it not undermine accuracy of Indian Brahmos class missiles, credibility of its Command and Control (C2) system and international aviation and safety protocols? What does Pakistan’s restraint mean? How has this cruise missile launch led to create renewed escalation risks? The study answers the above questions thereby offering some guiding posts for both the nuclear weapon states to avoid such reoccurrences in the future.

What happened?

The Pakistan’s ISPR through a press briefing revealed that an unarmed Indian, supersonic missile has landed in Pakistani territory, endangering several airliners in its trajectory and hitting a private property. Pakistan’s Air Force claimed to have tracked the missile’s flight path from launching site, Sirsa in Haryana, India. Subsequently, it altered track and maneuvered towards Pakistani territory while landing near Mian Channu after traveling around 80 miles inside Pakistan’s territory.3 Pakistan circulated a map displaying missile track that first headed south-west to travel 70-80 km while taking a right turn to head north-west to Pakistan. The missile entered 124 km inside Pakistan and was in Pakistani airspace for 3 minutes, 44 seconds while it remained airborne for less than seven minutes.4

The ISPR highlighted that the ‘the flight path of this projectile endangered many international and domestic passenger flights – both in Indian and Pakistani air space – as well as human life and property on ground.’5 Pakistan asked India for explanation on this incident. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) summoned the Indian envoy and expressed its discontentment.6 The ISPR conveyed Pakistan’s strong protest of the flagrant violation and cautioned against recurrence of any such incident in the future.’7 Two days later, on March 11, Indian authorities stated, ‘in the course of a routine maintenance, a technical malfunction led to the accidental firing of a missile’ – saying that the incident was ‘regrettable.’8 Indian authorities also stated that ‘the Government of India has taken a serious view and ordered a high-level Court of Enquiry.9

That was followed by a counter response from Pakistan’s MFA, with a long list of valid technical questions asking India to respond.10  Pakistan’s National Security Advisor, Moeed Yusuf lambasted India on social media, not just questioning safety of India’s ‘nuclear and other high end systems, asking if this was an ‘inadvertent launch or something more intentional.’11 Pakistan pronounced that ‘the Indian decision to hold an internal court of inquiry is not sufficient since the missile ended in Pakistani territory. Pakistan demands a joint probe to accurately establish the facts surrounding the incident.’12 This incident certainly questions India’s international obligations under the Article 2 (4)of the United Nations Charter that states, ‘all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.’13 In this sense this missile launch has not only blatantly violated Pakistan’s air space, but also undermined the global aviation rules and protocols thus endangering commercial flights, human life and property. India’s silence and cold response has led to build misperception in the mind of Pakistanis as to why India is not coming up openly on explaining this incident. The Pakistan’s MFA demanded for ‘a joint investigation.’14 A question was posed to the U.S. Department of State’s spokesman, Ned Price during a press conference for comments, he stated, ‘we have no indication, as you also heard from our Indian partners, that this incident was anything other than an accident. We refer you, of course, to the Indian Ministry of Defence for any follow-up.’15 There was muted response from the international community or institutions, presumably as the entire world is focused on Ukraine crisis and South Asia is not a priority region to the world. More so, the U.S. role as a crisis manager has diminished from South Asia because of global power shift and its strategic partnership with India. This puts to question U.S. standing as an honest broker between Pakistan and India. Pakistan instead has gotten adopted a resolution16 on peace and stability in South Asia by the 48th session of the Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) that was held in Pakistan between 22-23 March to discuss challenges being faced by the Muslim world and emerging opportunities.17 The resolution expressed deep concerns on this missile incident ‘which constituted multiple violations of international law, United Nations Charter, Articles of the Responsibility of states, civil aviation rules and safety protocol and endangered human life and property beside posing a grave threat to regional and international peace, security and stability.’18 The OIC Foreign Ministers endorsed Pakistan’s call for a joint probe to accurately establish the facts surrounding the incident.19 The envoys of the P-5 countries were also briefed about the developments while Pakistan’s representatives abroad have been asked to raise the matter in relevant international forums.20 ‘While calling on India to fully abide by its international obligations, the Resolution stresses that the duty to protect dangerous arsenals and materials and systems related to WMDs, as well as to ensure nuclear security, is a strict liability obligation under international law.’21 This incident warrants deeper assessment whether this was an accidental launch, as claimed by India or an advertent act.

Accidental or advertent launch?

There are two possible scenarios and each one of them raises alarming questions. One possible scenario is that the Indian missile landing during peace time was an advertent move in order to test readiness of Pakistan’s defense systems. Naeem Salik contends that India has built a ‘fabricated story’22 on its missile launch. Salik asserts that ‘the story India came out with doesn’t make sense and is a cover up because militaries do maintenance of weapons and equipment during daylight and not in the dark.’23 He said,

If it was an accidental launch it would have flown in a straight path and the sharp turn into Pakistan is inexplicable unless there was a technical malfunction and the control of the weapon was lost. Doing such a thing deliberately to test Pakistani reactions is too dangerous because they couldn’t have anticipated how Pakistan would react. What if Pakistan had launched one of its own missiles in response?

Zamir Akram also holds similar view that the chances of deliberate incursion seem high as India wanted to probe Pakistan’s response. He gave three reasons to expose India’s cover story: a) the missiles systems are always programmed under certain protocols that are routinely observed. This happened during routine maintenance and missiles are not kept in ready to launch state for routine maintenance. Accidents do not happen like this if the procedure are in place; b) What barred Indians from notifying Pakistan by using DGMOs or any other hotlines if it was a malfunction, Akram asked? The Indian took forty-eight hours to make a lame apology that too after Pakistan revealed the incident publicly; c) India’s fascist Modi government is also pursuing the strategic doctrine of a preemptive first-strike against Pakistan, with its adventurism being encouraged by the Indo-U.S. strategic partnership which has significantly enhanced India’s military capabilities. Akram reasserts that it seems deliberate intrusion as we have witnessed such incursions by Indian submarines a few weeks ago and earlier during the 2019 Balakot crisis, these submarines were clearly testing Pakistan’s detection and interdiction capabilities.

Another expert, Gen. Naeem Lodhi, when approached for comments, opined that ‘Modern missile systems have ‘fail-safe,’ multilayered ‘negative controls,’ ‘positive controls’ and ‘self-destruct’ arrangements. So this drama of an ‘accidental launch’ and then ‘turning’ at a specific waypoint towards a hostile country, defying all controls, is a farce.’24 He further argued, ‘The technical and strategic communities, world over, understand very well what is being said. The intentions were to ‘map the response parameters’ and an attempted ‘escalation dominance’25 Zamir Akram further stated that we are waiting for India to make it clear to us or consequently, Pakistan will have to make its own assessment of the incident whether it was truly ‘accidental’ or a deliberate incursion. Indeed, if this is the case then Pakistan will move to a more readiness mode, creating further heightened risks in the nuclearized region. When Naeem Salik was asked to comment on the consequences on such deliberate incursion, he also agreed, ‘this [incident] will lead to hair trigger readiness postures and immediate response in kind.’26

The other scenario is that it was indeed a malfunction involving human and technical errors. One, India revealed that the accidental launch took place during a Directorate of Air Staff Inspection (DASI) exercise at an Indian Air Force (IAF) base in north India. This could be a possibility, since India’s supersonic missiles development is still not complete and their accuracy is indeed not as robust as it is expected. Lapses in Indian missile systems and their lack of accuracy is generally apparent. The machines are always prone to error. Zamir Akram argues, 27

Even if the launch was accidental, it raises concern over the Indian fail-safe measures and procedures in place to prevent such accidents; while also indicating that Indian missiles are kept primed for launch even under routine maintenance. Such procedures were obviously not observed which, at the very least, underscore Indian irresponsibility, inefficiency and incompetence.

Two, Pakistan immediately perceived it as an accidental fire as Pakistan claims to have tracked it from the point of launch to the location it landed. Thus Pakistan chose restraint response.

It goes without saying that such accidental failure has also occurred in the past. On the U.S. side many ‘false alarms’ and significant accidents have been reported, ranging from minor to very grave, during the Cold War. Probably many incidents remained unreported to the public and the research community in order to prevent reputational cost. There have been many mishaps on the Soviet side too. Scott D. Sagan in his volume, The Limits of Safety, illustrates all such cases. On June 3, 1980 a false alarm created by a defective computer chip in a communication devise at North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) led to generate the erroneous warning in the U.S. The false alarm was perceived as that the Soviets have launched two hundred and twenty missiles which alerted American for a counterattack.28 Eric Schlosser in his ‘Command and Control,’29 assesses as to how systems instituted to regulate nuclear weapons, like all complex technologies are flawed as they are designed, built, installed and maintained by human beings.30 He shares as to how failure in C2 system can lead to annihilate the humanity inadvertently. The dangerous risks were attached to the Cold War model and the dangers still exist. The workforces operating these systems often suffer from low morale or inadequate training. While working with any new system, false alarms are highly likely. Andrew Futter stated, ‘I am not sure we can draw much about the missile from this incident.  Tests do go wrong.  But it does raise questions about command and control, security protocols and operational practices, and certainly challenges the narrative that weapons systems with possible strategic applications are carefully controlled.’31 He further stated that ‘this is not an isolated incident – history is full of accounts of accidents with highly dangerous weapons systems, including missile launches.’32

Futter comments, ‘this is potentially a very dangerous incident that could easily have led to misperception and escalation.  We have probably been lucky that this didn’t happen during a crisis or that the missile didn’t kill many people or destroy something.’33 Andrew further commented, ‘I have been surprised that this hasn’t gained more attention in Western media (which is almost completely focused on the war in Ukraine) given the seriousness.’34 Indeed the communication gap, ineffectiveness of hotlines and mistrust – that both the states have deepened after India’s striping Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status – could have led to create the huge probability for an unintended conflict.

The second scenario indeed raises a set of questions on effectiveness, credibility, accuracy and reliability of the Indian Brahmos class missile regiment. This also raises questions on robustness of Indian C2 system. This certainly proves the Indian neglect for aviation safety protocols and questions their technological prowess, credibility of their program. Restrained response of Pakistan undoubtedly have prevented an escalation of the incident, but India’s international credentials as a responsible nuclear weapons state are under a big question mark. Frank O’Donnell, Deputy Director of the South Asia program at the Washington-based Stimson Center said, ‘India would need to take corrective measures, to reassure its own citizens and the world of the security of its missile forces such as a suspension of missile tests and a review of the command-and-control procedures as first steps.’35

A decision to wait to make sure that the attack is for real was highly mature and rational. Under such pressing circumstances, the temperaments of the leader are equally important than the information being offered by the system or surveillance made. Such Indian mistake could have escalated into a major confrontation.

Emergence of renewed risks

Despite all the precautions in place on both sides, the possibility of an inadvertent war due to an unpredicted sequence of events remains as a deadly threat to both countries and to the world. Regardless of whether it was an advertent or accidental launch, the incident was exceedingly risky, that carried enormous potential to invite a bigger crisis thus endangering humanity. India and Pakistan, due to their geographical proximity do not have the luxury of time for rational decision-making with airborne missiles launched from either side. Imagine that the entire flight time of the missile was less than seven minutes that is about the time available for the decision-makers in either country to verify and respond. Within six minutes the two leaders sitting in Islamabad and New Delhi have to determine whether it is an accidental launch or actual attack and the need to retaliate amid such crisis situation. This time, there was no collateral damage, which led to Pakistan’s restraint response thereby reducing risks of any escalation. Had there been any cost of human lives, destruction of economic or critical infrastructure, that would have introduced possibly different outcomes. ‘Had the Pakistani side chosen to retaliate to the breach of its airspace, the outcome could have been ‘very different,’ said Frank O’Donnell.36 Akram also commented, ‘If Pakistan’s air defense had judged the unguided missile to be the start of an Indian missile attack, Pakistan would not only have shot down the missile but could have launched its own missiles against Indian targets. Such breakdown of deterrence between two nuclear powers could have escalated into a major confrontation.’37 India and Pakistan have negotiated confidence-building and nuclear risk-reduction measures in the past. These initiatives include a 1988 agreement to refrain from attacking nuclear installations, involving an annual exchange of details of designated facilities; a 1991 accord to notify each other, and limit the geographic space, of major military exercises; a 2005 arrangement on pre-notification of ballistic missile flight-tests;38 a 2007 agreement on immediate notification of nuclear accidents. Notably, the cruise missiles are not included in the existing nuclear CBMs regime. Exclusion of notifications of cruise missile flight-tests, creates space for the dangers of misinterpretation of cruise missile launches. Broken communication channels, inactive hotlines, no official-level interaction to discuss conventional or nuclear confidence building measures made this accident very perilous. This incident may drive both the states towards further arms racing, arms readiness and deployment of arsenals. As for the future, Salik while refereeing to hair trigger readiness postures argued that this development has led to create renewed consequences especially during crises and periods of high tension.39

Risks Reduction Measures

The two states have achieved nuclear learning and enough nuclear efficiency and sufficiency to harm each other. Both should work on minimizing the risk of unauthorized or accidental launch or detonation, misperceptions and miscalculations. A most urgent need is reactivation of strategic communication channels and establishing additional ones for crisis management. Some risk reduction measures may include: one, both should urgently and formally expand the scope of 2005 ballistic missile test pre-notification agreement to include cruise missiles. Futter also suggests, ‘If there isn’t already then missile test and launch notifications for each side would be a good idea, and immediate notification via a secure high-level hotline if accidents like this ever happen again.  It would also clearly be a good idea not to test missiles near either the India-Pakistan (or India-China border).40 Salik also argued, ‘There is also a need to bring into missile test notification agreement the notification of cruise missiles, including air launched and sea/subsea launched cruise missiles.’41 Two, restraint measures should be taken against the deployment of de-stabilizing systems which could seriously impact crises and arms control stability and initiate talks between both sides to clarify the nature of different missiles as which ones are conventional and which ones are assigned with strategic role; Three, keep the DGMOs hotlines under all the circumstances open despite their on-going mistrust and differences developed in the backdrop of Balakot crisis and the Indian striping of semi-autonomous status of Kashmir. Gen. Lodhi stated, ‘this incident also indicates a great vulnerability in the Indo-Pak situation, and that is the missing hotlines and prompt communication channels between two nuclear neighbors. This ought to be corrected on priority, otherwise one and a half billion human lives will remain in jeopardy.’42 Indeed, reactivation of the hotlines will help minimize the potential risks during crises. Four, India-Pakistan 2007 agreement on prevention of accidental and unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons ‘need to be amended to explicitly mention delivery systems as well or there could be a new agreement to cover inadvertent/accidental firing of missiles.’43 Five, reactivating dialogue on all the issues including Kashmir will minimize growing uncertainty and mistrust; Six, introducing code of conduct on use of media during crises as media does play a sensational role in escalating not de-escalating the crisis situation; finally both the states should lead to further-reaching arms control or stabilization initiatives, including prospective nuclear force and infrastructural reductions.

Conclusion

Whether the incident was accidental or deliberate incursion, both ways, it questions India’s irresponsible behavior. If India has taken such move based on malign intentions, it has undertaken a huge risky misadventure to test Pakistan’s national resolve while violating United Nations Charter, international aviation rules and safety protocols. India would be gravely mistaken if it draws some wrong conclusions from this misadventure. Given the absence of hostilities and a set of other instances, Pakistan acted with prudence. However, it would be dangerous and totally wrong to assume that an actual crisis situation might evidence similar restraint from Pakistan. If the incident was a malfunction then it questions credibility of Indian Cruise missiles regiment, its C2 system and safety procedures and efficiency of workforce. Luck has been on the side of both the states that lack of collateral damage restrained Pakistan’s retaliation. Testing a nuclear weapon state’s tolerance and patience level is always risky and catastrophic. Both states should have no illusion that uncontrollable escalation risks are attached given the geographical proximity and time factor involved on nuclear use decision. More so, role of any outsider player as a facilitator in crisis management is exceedingly limited. Both should act rationally as emotional and intolerant behavior is not commensurate with the responsibility of a nuclear weapon state.

The two states should urgently extend the 2005 ballistic missile test pre-notification agreement; initiate an agreement on the deployment of de-stabilizing systems; initiate talks between both sides to clarify the nature of different missiles to which ones are conventional and which ones are assigned with strategic role; amend the 2007 agreement to include delivery systems; initiate a new agreement to cover inadvertent/accidental firing of missiles and also fully activate all the hotlines, strategic communication channels even during peace time and/or crisis situations. Both should make certain compromises in order to implement risks reduction measures to avoid such misadventures thus evading misperceptions, accidents and inadvertent escalation. Finally, the international community has a role in preventing crisis, upholding strategic stability in South Asia and shunning policies which accentuate asymmetries and threaten regional balance.

About the Author

Dr. Rizwana Abbasi

The author is an Associate Professor at the National University of Modern Languages, Islamabad, Pakistan.

2 ICAO: ‘Resolution,’ https://www.icao.int/Pages/default.aspx

3 Dawn: ‘India to explain what happened in Mian Channu,’ says DG ISPR after Indian projectile falls in Pakistan.’

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 ‘Pak summons Indian envoy over alleged violation of its airspace by missile,’ Business Standard, March 11, 2022: https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/pak-summons-indian-envoy-over-alleged-violation-of-its-airspace-by-missile-122031101036_1.html

7 Dawn, ‘Indian missile flew over 100km inside Pakistan: ISPR,’ March 11, 2022: https://www.dawn.com/news/1679361

8 Aljazeera: ‘India says it accidentally fired missile into Pakistan,’ March 11, 2022: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/11/india-says-it-accidentally-fired-missile-into-pakistan

9 Ibid.

10 Dawn: ‘Why did India fail to immediately inform about accidental missile launch? asks Pakistan’, Dawn, March 12, 2022: https://www.dawn.com/news/1679603

11 NSA Yusuf calls for investigation to know real reason behind Indian missile incident, The News, March 11, 2022: https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/940620-nsa-yusuf-calls-for-investigation

12 ‘Pakistan demands joint probe into ‘accidental’ India missile fire’, Reuters, March 12, 2022: https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/pakistan-demands-joint-probe-into-accidental-india-missile-fire-2022-03-12/

13 See ‘Charter of the United Nations’: https://legal.un.org/repertory/art2.shtml

14 Dawn: ‘Why did India fail to immediately inform about accidental missile launch? asks Pakistan’.

15 ‘No indication India’s missile launch into Pakistan was anything other than accident: US,’ Dawn, March 15, 2022: https://www.dawn.com/news/1680102

16 ‘OIC endorses Pakistan’s call for a joint probe into the 9 March 2022 missile incident,’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs: https://mofa.gov.pk/oic-endorses-pakistans-call-for-a-joint-probe-into-the-9-march-2022-missile-incident/

17 MFA: ‘OIC endorses Pakistan’s call for a joint probe into the 9 March 2022 missile incident’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan , March 23, 2022: https://mofa.gov.pk/oic-endorses-pakistans-call-for-a-joint-probe-into-the-9-march-2022-missile-incident/

18 Ibid.

19 MFA: ‘OIC endorses Pakistan’s call for a joint probe into the 9 March 2022 missile incident’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan , March 23, 2022: https://mofa.gov.pk/oic-endorses-pakistans-call-for-a-joint-probe-into-the-9-march-2022-missile-incident/

20 Author’s Interview with Kamran Akhtar, Director General of Arms Control and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan (March 16, 2022).

21 MFA: ‘OIC endorses Pakistan’s call for a joint probe into the 9 March 2022 missile incident’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan , March 23, 2022: https://mofa.gov.pk/oic-endorses-pakistans-call-for-a-joint-probe-into-the-9-march-2022-missile-incident/

22 Author’s Interview with Brig (Retd) Dr. Naeem Salik, Senior Research Fellow, Center for International Strategic Studies, March 23, 2022.

23 Ibid.

24 Author’s Interview with Lt. Gen Naeem Lodhi (Retired) and former Deference Secretary of Pakistan (March 23, 2022).

25 Authors’ interview with Lodhi.

26 Author’s Interview with Salik.

27 Author’s Interview with Ambassador (Retd) Zamir Akram, Advisor to the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan (March 23, 2022).

28 Eric Schlosser, ‘World War Three, By Mistake’, The New Yorker, December 23, 2016.

29 Eric Schlosser, Command and Control (New York, Penguin Group, 2014).

30 Ibid.

31 Author’s Interview with Andrew Futter, Professor of International Relations at the University of Leicester, UK (March 16, 2022).

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.

35 Quoted in Nirupama Subramanian, Pakistan seeks joint probe after India misfires missile, The Indian Express, March 13, 2022: https://indianexpress.com/article/india/day-after-india-cites-technical-malfunction-for-missile-firing-pakistan-joint-probe-7816730/

36 Ibid.

37 Author’s interview with Akram.

38Under this accord Indian and Pakistan agreed to inform each other of a planned five-day period within which a ballistic missile test will take place, with three days’ notice of the initiation of this window. The notification includes a warning of the air and naval areas to be affected by the test. India and Pakistan have also pledged that missiles will not overfly the international border and/or Line of Control, and that their trajectories will remain at least 40 km away from and land at least 75 km from these boundaries.

39 Author’s Interview with Salik.

40 Author’s Interview with Futter.

41 Author’s Interview with Salik.

42 Author’s Interview with Lodhi