A Critical Security Studies approach to Regional Security: SAARC during COVID 19 Crisis

Abstract

Due to the global and transverse dimension of the COVID-19 pandemic, the human security approach has found relevance in the policy corridors and prompted interest in regional cooperation. The growing consideration of the human security paradigm is a welcome alternative to the existing security discourse on South Asian regional security dominated by state centrism. Nevertheless, various critical security scholars have critiqued the human security paradigm, claiming it does not question the structural inequalities reinforced by the state and thus fails to displace the state as the central security actor. It is thus imperative that post-positivist critical security approaches are acknowledged in the interests of re-defining security in South Asia, to advise on practical policy considerations. This paper argues that the revival of SAARC and the creation of the COVID-19 emergency fund reproduce state-centric security discourse, which ignores structural inequalities at play and marginalises the security of the most vulnerable communities. It adds to the debate on alternative discourse on regional security in South Asia with discussion on critical security approaches. Furthermore, it explains SAARC’s importance to member states as a vehicle for regional cooperation in the face of pandemics and other natural calamities. It also discusses how the SAARC COVID-19 emergency fund has grown to include mechanisms and structures where critical security ideas can be put into practice.

Introduction

Security for man is a primordial need. The COVID-19 pandemic has presented human society with such multi-dimensional challenges that it has redefined security and placed it at the top of the agenda for all policymakers. Due to the global and transverse dimension of the COVID-19 pandemic, the human security approach found relevance in South Asian policy corridors. Furthermore, it has prompted an effort to resuscitate the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with the setting up of the COVID-19 Emergency Fund.1 Human security, as defined by the UN resolution, is an approach by states to address widespread challenges to the survival, livelihood, and dignity of their people.2 In this regard, the security discourse in South Asia, previously dominated by military-based approaches to security, has accommodated articulations of human security.3 However, various scholars have critiqued the human security approach for failing to question the existing structural inequalities reinforced by the state.4 It is thus imperative that post-positivist critical security approaches be acknowledged in the interest of re-defining security in South Asia to inform practical policy considerations. While the human security paradigm, assuming humans as the referents of security rather than the state, has been acknowledged by SAARC member states through the creation of the COVID-19 Emergency Fund. In this paper, it is argued that the existing SAARC’s emergency COVID-19 fund reproduces the dominant security discourse and fails to displace member states as the central security actors. It discusses the critical security approach in the context of regional security in South Asia and explains SAARC’s importance for member states as a vehicle for regional cooperation during COVID-19. Additionally, it discusses the SAARC emergency response fund as a case for regional cooperation, which can be expanded to include mechanisms and structures where critical security approaches can be brought from theory to practice.

Critical Security Approach in South Asia

There needs to be further exploration of alternative regional security approaches to the state-centric security discourse of South Asia to broaden the human security paradigm. It has been highlighted by scholars that the dominant discourse on regional security in South Asia remains rooted in neo-realist security where the state is the central security actor.5 Such perspectives remain tied to state survival and territorial integrity due to the history of interstate conflicts, border disputes, and civil unrest amongst member states. Consequently, security actors other than the state are marginalised from the debate. However, scholars have acknowledged the value of the human security approach in analysing security in South Asia. They need to recognise the security and needs of the people by separating them from the security of the state, as argued in the context of South Asia.6 Furthermore, human security is viewed as instrumental in bridging the long-held divide between traditional military-based ideas of security.7 While the human security approach provides a critique of the dominant security discourse in South Asia, it falls short in some respects that are addressed by the critical security approach.

The critical security discourse provided by post-positivist critical security studies widens the debate on human security. Human security is critiqued by various scholars for its conceptualization of security within pre-existing economic and socio-political structures. Post-positivists address the need to question the role of the state in sustaining the conditions of insecurity among certain individuals and communities.8 Furthermore, it criticises viewing human security as a singular and universal concept.9 Hence, the critical security approach seeks to uncover the ground realities to broaden the debate on human security. Thus, recognising human security is the first step in the critical security approach. The second step is to reconsider how security is understood in a “threat-response” framework, given the notion of security as a social construction.10 Such a conception acknowledges that security meanings mean something different to everyone.

The critical security approach provides an alternative and goes beyond the human security paradigm. This alternative approach attempts to challenge the discourse on security by asking “security for whom” and providing an agenda for security studies that are rooted in the ground realities of the South Asian region.11 However, they are divided in realising a vision of security for the referents of security.12 One such post-positivist approach is geared toward de-securitization, while the latter advocates redefining security. Intersubjective insecurity is taken as an existential threat that demands immediate attention and extraordinary measures.13 However, it is noted that de-securitization produces a normative dilemma by accepting the ‘truth’ about security and reinforces the militaristic view that the state is required to manage threats.14 Considering it is the state that “securitizes”, de-securitizing leaves the issue to the political elites.15 Thus, redefining security through an emancipatory alternative where particular communities can secure rights for themselves is more appropriate in the context of the COVID-19 human crisis in South Asia.

The ‘broadening’ of the concept of security through emancipation is pertinent to South Asian politics as it is at the behest of state elites reproducing dominant discourse. In contrast with the de-securitization approach, the emancipatory approach posits that “security” itself is the absence of threats. Thus, emancipation is the freedom from all constraints which hinder their growth and liberties, such as war, poor education, or political oppression.16 The redefinition of security acknowledges the multi-levels of security to respond to all forms of violence, direct, structural, or ecological.17 Critical security scholars thus encourage other entities like civil society organisations (CSOs) to influence the security agenda by identifying threats to referent groups. Thus, Behera (2004) argues for opening up the concept of security in South Asia by separating security from state security and providing the opportunity for constructive interaction between people across borders. This allows them to engage with the state to mitigate the threat to “security” as defined by the referents themselves. An interest in redefining security in such terms recognises other agents of security, incorporates local contexts and people’s agency in addressing their security concerns. Thus, it is pertinent to acknowledge the critical security approach in South Asian regional security to inform practical policy considerations about SAARC’s COVID-19 response.

Security Challenges in South Asia in COVID-19

To realise the critical security approach to regional security, it’s imperative to understand the ground realities and unique challenges of South Asians during the COVID-19 pandemic. The challenges for South Asian countries are perverse, with already limited healthcare capacities, widespread poverty, and rampant corruption region-wide. Experts have predicted that the pandemic would severely impact low-income people, specifically informal workers, and further reinforce socio-economic inequality in South Asia.18 Moreover, overburdened healthcare systems and slow vaccinations reflected under-investment in human development by South Asian countries, and smaller countries relied on India for vaccines that India could not support.19 With active slums in the region, there was an impossibility that social distancing and the flattened curve concept would be effective. Millions of people live in Mumbai’s Dharavi slum, Karachi’s Orangi Town, and Bangladesh’s slums and Rohingya refugee camps, where containing the spread of the virus and providing effective healthcare presented exceptional challenges to South Asian governments.20 Moreover, minority communities were greatly impacted by insensitive government policies, such as the compulsory cremation policy in Sri Lanka and the stigmatisation of Tablighi Jamaat, or Muslim missionaries, in India.21 Lack of proper healthcare, protective equipment for doctors and allocation of resources to already poverty-stricken communities were evident realities. In this regard, there was an effort at regional engagement and a revival of the SAARC platform, which had largely been dysfunctional due to the geopolitical rivalry between India and Pakistan.

SAARC Revival and COVID-19 Emergency Fund

Given the challenging times, the two rivalling member states (India and Pakistan) understood the importance of SAARC and its relevance as a means for regional cooperation during the COVID-19 crisis. India initiated an effort to respond to the challenges faced due to the pandemic by setting up the SAARC emergency response fund as a means to address the insecurity brought on by the crisis.22 While India had previously focused on sub-regional organisations with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, and Nepal in the BBIN Initiative and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), it chose SAARC to coordinate COVID-19 efforts.23 This shows India’s realisation of SAARC as an important platform for political visibility internationally and to establish its regional leadership. On the other hand, Pakistan was provided with a chance through SAARC’s revival to emerge out of diplomatic isolation and rebuild its ties with other regional partners. Since then, it’s been acknowledged that peace and security in the context of South Asia cannot be achieved without Pakistan as a nuclear power, and Pakistan’s exclusion from the regional processes will not pay off.24 Pakistan’s contribution to the fund as well as its willingness to host the ministerial meeting on COVID-19 shows that it too recognises the importance of engaging with SAARC members.25 In this regard, Pakistan’s re-engagement with SAARC provides an entry point to rebuilding its standing in the region, and India’s setting up of an emergency fund reflects the member states’ recognition of SAARC as an important vehicle for regional security in South Asia.

While recognising the importance of SAARC, the collective action of setting up the SAARC emergency response fund acknowledges the state’s realisation of human security in times of coronavirus outbreak. The SAARC emergency response fund proposed by India during the video conference was an effort to pool regional resources and coordinate a collective response to the COVID-19 crisis with Pakistan pledging $3 million.26 In contrast, the region’s trade in the past has been affected by restrictive actions in the form of intra-regional tariffs and nontariff barriers. As a result, this flurry of cooperation could be a long-term opportunity for member states to work together to eliminate these restrictive tariffs, particularly for the movement of healthcare supplies and innovative technologies. Furthermore, the Indian PM stated that the funds could be used by any of the member states to meet immediate needs and that foreign secretaries could coordinate to finalise the concept of this fund and its operations.27 In this regard, it can be claimed that traditional security concerns were set aside to focus joint action on human security challenges presented in the region. It ignores the dilemma of unequal resource allocation, which persists despite the respective countries’ economic growth in the past years and persistent socio-economic inequality.

Moreover, the fund’s allocation reproduces the region’s security challenges and reflects a top-down and state-centric approach rather than the constructive interaction of people across borders. It was revealed that SAARC member states could decide on the timing, manner, and implementation of their SAARC fund commitments.28 The Indian PM’s invitation to all foreign secretaries to decide on the management of the fund exemplifies a state-centric approach. Moreover, Pakistan disbursed its COVID-19 fund to Malaysia and India, choosing Nepal as the biggest beneficiary.29 Hence, it is undeniable that these actions suggest a materialisation of security through the bureaucratic structures of the state. In this regard, it is conceivable that the disbursement of the fund to any member state remains tied to the shortage of resources and the spread of the virus. This indicates that the fund will be sanctioned by certain triggers to disperse funds, such as the death toll, the virus spread across the population ratio, and the existing resources of the state. Thus, the existing mechanisms of SAARC’s emergency COVID-19 fund reproduce the dominant security discourse and fail to displace member states as the central security actors, whilst ignoring the “realities” of the people to secure their rights.

Conclusion

To sum up, it must be reiterated that South Asian security discourse has inadequately incorporated the voices of critical security theorists advocating the inclusion of marginalised security actors. In a region where political elites form the thrust of state-centric security policies, there is a need to view human security as a pluralistic conception. Acknowledging that “security means different things for different people”, the emancipatory approach provides an alternative to formulating policies that place the grassroots voices at the centre of the process. The emancipatory alternative to COVID-19 crisis management would require democratic rebuilding of policies (such as complete lockdowns), considering the ground realities of the poorest communities in refugee camps and slum areas. The incompatibility of policies like social distancing and lockdowns with minimal income support from the government must be highlighted. A critical security perspective would require the SAARC to engage with the grassroots voices, which would provide a better understanding of the insecurities of the people and offer solutions accordingly. SAARC believes CSOs and NGOs working with the most vulnerable communities must be included in SAARC’s emergency fund response and informed on how and where to focus their energies. Thus, critical security approaches allow a holistic regional response to mitigating the effects of the virus through the constructive interaction of people across borders and the inclusion of NGOs, CSOs, and other epistemic communities.

Policy Recommendations

With regards to the way forward, lessons from other regional efforts can be used to expand and inform the concept-building of the SAARC emergency fund. Such as the lack of compliance with WHO health guidelines, which has been addressed in other regions through the use of behavioural research for information broadcasting and creating awareness. Behavioural insights approaches are commonly used in the Arab region to change the behaviours of people in response to the crisis.30 It is essentially a problem-solving approach that places people at the centre of the process and creates relevant solutions to behavioural barriers. Moreover, the ASEAN Special Summit on Coronavirus Disease emphasised structures and mechanisms based on a multi-sector, multi-stakeholder, and whole-of-ASEAN community approach to ensure a collective response to the pandemic.31 It can help member states of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) learn how to set up an emergency fund that includes different security groups and allows people to have the right to life and dignity when there is a crisis.

About the Author

Madiha Hassan

The author is a Junior Research Fellow at Roads Initiative.

Bibliography