It is evident from world history that, more often than not, diplomatic breakthroughs leading to lasting peace have occurred in the aftermath of wars. However, in the case of India and Pakistan, despite fighting three major wars (1948, 1965, and 1971), as well as limited conflicts like the Kargil War in 1999 and the recent episode of 2025, along with numerous other crises and skirmishes in between, there has been no substantial diplomatic progress towards peace or conflict resolution. For instance, after the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States and the Soviet Union established the Moscow-Washington Direct Hotline, referred to as the “Red Phone,” to manage future crises[1]. That crisis became a catalyst for negotiations aimed at preventing future escalations and reducing strategic uncertainty. Much like India and Pakistan, the U.S. and USSR had stood on the brink of a nuclear standoff, but they chose to institutionalize crisis management protocols rather than allowing the crisis to deepen their divisions. In stark contrast, the Indo-Pakistan situation continues to deteriorate, with little hope for peace under the current circumstances. A multitude of structural fault lines, ranging from entrenched nationalisms and militarized strategic cultures to the absence of robust diplomatic frameworks and crisis management mechanisms, persistently hinder the path toward effective diplomacy and conflict resolution.
Several complex factors contribute to the deterioration of Pakistan–India relations, making it difficult for post-crisis diplomacy to take hold, thus deepening mistrust and uncertainty between the two nuclear-armed rivals. A fundamental issue is the absence of a strategic culture that perceives crises as gateways to dialogue and conflict resolution[2]. Instead, conflicts are framed as opportunities to showcase national resolve and military strength, leading to post-conflict debates focused on narratives of victory rather than pathways to lasting peace[3]. The role of media and public sentiment further compounds this challenge. In the aftermath of crises, media outlets amplify nationalist rhetoric, fueling public emotions and creating a hostile environment for any diplomatic overtures[4]. This sentiment is often politically exploited; for instance, Indian leadership has frequently leveraged anti-Pakistan narratives for domestic electoral gains, turning public sentiment into a political tool that also obstructs post-crisis diplomacy[5]. Additionally, the strong influence of the security establishments in both countries prioritizes deterrence postures and military responses over political recalibration, perpetuating an escalation cycle under the guise of strategic stability. The absence of institutionalized diplomatic mechanisms or crisis management protocols further exacerbates this volatile dynamic[6]. Unlike global precedents where adversaries have established crisis hotlines or backchannels to manage tensions, India and Pakistan lack structured frameworks that automatically activate during crises to contain escalation and foster dialogue. The 2025 episode, like many before it, presented a critical opportunity to institutionalize such mechanisms, but without strategic foresight and political will, these opportunities are consistently squandered, entrenching the region in perpetual instability.
The 2025 episode between India and Pakistan tells a story of South Asia’s persistent failure in crisis diplomacy. Following the Pahalgam incident, India accused Pakistan of backing the perpetrators, while Pakistan categorically denied involvement and called for an impartial investigation backed by evidence[7]. Instead of providing evidence, India launched Operation Sindoor, employing missile and drone strikes against Pakistani targets. Had there been an operational backchannel or diplomatic forum for immediate dialogue, the situation might not have escalated to this extent. In retaliation, Pakistan initiated Operation Banyanum Marsoos, striking back at Indian positions[8]. When Pakistan shot down five Indian Rafale jets during the operation, India denied the losses, and the discourse shifted to narratives of victory, fueling nationalist sentiments on both sides. This narrative war overshadowed any prospects for post-crisis diplomacy. Although U.S. President Trump facilitated a ceasefire agreement, Indian Prime Minister Modi continued to declare in Parliament that Operation Sindhoor was still ongoing[9]. More recently, India initiated Operation Mahadev, targeting individuals after labeling them as “Pakistani terrorists” without presenting sufficient evidence on international platforms[10]. This cycle of action and reaction has only deteriorated the situation further, leaving little room for optimism regarding peace. A crucial element missing is political will, particularly on the Indian side, possibly due to deep-rooted mistrust or the domestic political advantages derived from nationalist posturing. Interestingly, opposition voices, especially from the Congress leadership, have criticized the Modi government’s approach, which still offers a glimmer of hope[11]. The key challenge now lies in how Pakistan can proactively advocate for the establishment of a structured post-crisis diplomatic mechanism to prevent such escalations in the future.
The only way to break the vicious cycle of conflict between India and Pakistan is to adopt a new approach to crisis diplomacy—one that does not view crises solely as moments to display resolve and military capability, but as opportunities to reset political relations. The first step towards creating such an environment is to nurture a strategic culture that offers space for peace efforts rather than automatically escalating tensions. This requires moving beyond zero-sum nationalism by promoting a public narrative that sees post-conflict diplomacy as a strength and a commitment to lasting peace, rather than a weakness. While the prospects of such a shift from the Modi regime seem limited, Pakistan can take the lead as an advocate for regional stability. With Pakistan’s current favorable position (improved ties with the U.S., a successful trade deal under President Trump, strong relations with China, and membership of the UNSC), this is an opportune moment to engage regional and global stakeholders in creating a new diplomatic architecture. Institutionalizing a crisis management framework is crucial; both nations should agree upon diplomatic protocols and backchannel mechanisms that automatically activate during crises, providing a structured approach to conflict management and enhancing Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). Track-II diplomacy can also be instrumental by involving academics, civil society, sports personalities, and retired officials to foster people-to-people connections, thereby reducing ultranationalist sentiments. Most importantly, both governments must prioritize diplomatic engagement over military signaling in post-crisis scenarios. While deterrence may provide a fragile form of “ugly stability,” lasting peace requires building trust through structured diplomatic engagements and proactive crisis management mechanisms.
About the Author
Syed Inam Ali Naqvi
Syed Inam Ali Naqvi is a Silk Road Scholar at the Silk Road School, Renmin University of China, specializing in Contemporary China Studies. He holds a degree in International Relations from the University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. His research and writing focus on Asia-Pacific international relations, Contemporary China, and South Asia. This blog is part of the collection from the ROADS Initiative Summer School.
[1] “Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations.” n.d. Milestones in the History of U.S. Foreign Relations – Office of the Historian. Accessed August 1, 2025. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/cuban-missile-crisis.
[2] Saba Kiran. 2023. “Strategic Culture of India and Pakistan and Its Implications for Strategic Stability”. NUST Journal of International Peace & Stability 7 (1):51-63. https://doi.org/10.37540/njips.v7i1.159.
[3] Farhan Hanif Siddiqi, “The Resolve Paradox in India‑Pakistan Crisis Bargaining,” South Asian Voices, May 23, 2025, https://southasianvoices.org/sec-m-pak-r-resolve-paradox-india-pakistan-bargaining-05-23-2025/.
[4] Fiaz Pampori, “For Success of India‑Pakistan Talks for Resolution, Media Must Behave Responsibly,” Kashmir Times, May 11, 2025, https://kashmirtimes.com/opinion/comment-articles/for-success-of-india-pakistan-talks-for-resolution-media-must‑behave‑responsibly.
[5] Hussain, Abid. 2024. “As India’s Modi brings Pakistan into election campaign, will ties worsen?” Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/5/17/as-indias-modi-drags-pakistan-into-election-campaign-will-ties-worsen.
[6] Riaz Mohammad Khan, “Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges in Pakistan‑India Relations,” in Investigating Crises: South Asia’s Lessons, Evolving Dynamics, and Trajectories, ed. Sameer Lalwani and Hannah Haegeland (Washington, D.C.: Stimson Center, 2018), chap. “Conflict Resolution and Crisis Management: Challenges in Pakistan‑India Relations”, 2018, PDF file, https://www.stimson.org/wp-content/files/InvestigatingCrisesConflictResolution.pdf
[7] Imtiaz Gul, “Pahalgam: Indian Blame Game and Ground Realities,” The Express Tribune (Karachi), April 26, 2025, https://tribune.com.pk/story/2542287/pahalgam‑indian‑blame‑game‑and‑ground‑realities.
[8] Sameer Ali Khan, “Who Really Re‑Established Deterrence? The Case of Operations Sindoor and Bunyan‑u‑Marsoos,” Centre for Strategic and Contemporary Research (CSCR), 2025, https://cscr.pk/explore/themes/defense-security/who-really-re-established-deterrence-the-case-of-operations-sindoor-and-bunyanum-marsoos/.
[9] PM Modi Says Operation Sindoor Still On, Denies Global Pressure to Halt India’s Response,” The New Indian Express, July 29, 2025, https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2025/Jul/29/pm‑modi‑says‑operation‑sindoor‑still‑on‑denies‑global‑pressure‑to‑halt‑indias‑response
[10] “Three Pakistani Militants Killed in Dachigam Encounter: Army,” The Hindu, July 28, 2025, accessed July 31, 2025, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/three‑pakistani‑militants‑killed‑in‑dachigam‑encounter‑army/article69870383.ece.
[11] “Operation Sindoor Debate: PM Modi Has Blood on His Hands of Pahalgam Victims, Says Rahul Gandhi,” Deccan Herald, July 29, 2025, https://www.deccanherald.com/india/operation-sindoor-debate-rahul-gandhi-launches-a-scathing-attack-on-modi-govt-3654194.